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Judging Science: The Rewards and Perils of Courts as 
Boundary Organizations 
Sonya Ziaja* and Christopher Fullerton** 
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II. IN WHAT WAYS CAN COURTS BE CONSIDERED BOUNDARY 
 ORGANIZATIONS? 
A. Courts as Policy-Makers 
B.  Gate-Keepers and Directors of Science—The Delta Smelt 
 Consolidated Cases 
1. History of the Dispute 
2. District Court’s Role in Defining Relevant and 
Legitimate Science 
C. Beyond Gatekeeping: Courts as Science Managers 
III.  LESSONS FOR OTHER BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS 
A.  Constraints on Involvement 
B. Multiple Nested Levels of Review 
C. Mechanisms for Adaptation and Learning 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Abstract 
Courts have become increasingly important arenas for mediating 
between competing interests in the interpretation and implementation of 
science-informed public policies.  This function becomes particularly 
pronounced in the deliberations over the implementation of detailed 
legislative mandates and administrative rules by federal agencies.  These 
public policies often involve complex social-ecological system relationships 
and become enmeshed in “wicked problems” without clear resolution, and 
susceptible to intense rounds of litigation.  This paper reviews the literature 
on boundary organizations, which serve the role of intermediary between the 
scientific community and policymakers, with an emphasis on adaptive 
decision-making processes in response to high levels of complexity and 
uncertainty.  This model is then applied to trial and appellate courts, with 
particular attention toward how courts serve as a forum for the 
communication and comparative analysis of competing and conflicting 
scientific research.  In this setting, the judge (or judges) can serve as a 
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critically important gatekeeper in overseeing the inclusion or exclusion of 
scientific research and the testimony of expert witnesses during court 
proceedings.  The discretion given to trial judges during appellate review 
underscores the pivotal role of the court of first instance in monitoring the 
admissibility of “best available science” in judicial proceedings.  The 
benefits and shortcomings of having these societal functions fulfilled by 
judges, who are often not extensively trained in scientific methodologies 
and research approaches, are reviewed.  Finally, recommendations for 
further study are offered to investigate the relative capacities of the courts as 
boundary organizations in greater detail. 
I. Introduction 
It is the aim of litigation to achieve social peace. 
~Judge Leon Yankwich1 
 
I hear the jury’s still out on science. 
~Gob Bluth, Arrested Development2 
 
The trajectory of environmental governance and legal scholarship over 
the past forty years has followed ecology in embracing complexity and 
uncertainty.3  Not only are ecosystems complex by themselves, but they are 
 
 *Ph.D. Candidate, University of Arizona, School of Geography and Development; 
M.Sc., University of Oxford, 2012; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law, 2009; B.A., University of Michigan, 2004.  The author can be reached at: 
sonya.ziaja@energy.ca.gov. 
 **Ph.D. student, University of Arizona, School of Geography and Development; 
M.H.P., University of Georgia, 2004; J.D., University of Georgia, 2003; B.A., Yale 
College, 2000. 
 The authors would like to thank Professor Connie Woodhouse for her insightful 
comments on an early draft of this paper and Dr. Daniel Ferguson for fruitful 
conversations about the intersection of legal thinking and science translation. 
 1. Leon Yankwich, Crystallization of Issues by Pretrial: A Judge’s View, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 470, 478 (1958). 
2. Arrested Development: Notapusy (Imagine Television et al. Nov. 7, 2005). 
3. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994); A. Dan Tarlock, The 
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY.  
L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1139 (1994). 
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part of larger social-ecological systems that are even more complex.4  Nature 
is in a constant state of flux and human influence cannot be removed from 
it.5  The conflicts that arise over competing uses for natural resources are by 
their nature complex and remarkably difficult to resolve as well.  They are 
classic “wicked problems”6 that “cannot be separated from issues of values, 
equity, and social justice.”7 
  
 
4. Complex systems are characterized by multiple elements that interact in 
interdependent and dynamic ways.  See, e.g., EDELLA SCHLAGER & WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, 
EMBRACING WATERSHED POLITICS 10, 12 (2008); Elinor Ostrom et al., Going Beyond Panaceas, 
104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15176 (2007); Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going 
Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15181 (2007); Elinor Ostrom, A General 
Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SCI. 419 (2009). 
5. See, e.g., Carl J. Walters & Crawford Stanley Holling, Large-scale Management 
Experiments and Learning by Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060, 2067 (1990).  This shift has 
implications for ecosystem management and governance, in no small part because 
the major environmental laws—for example, the Endangered Species Act and the 
Clean Water Act—were written under a different paradigm that assumed nature 
could reach a state of equilibrium and human influence could be removed from 
ecosystems.  Tarlock, supra note 3; J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 
34 HOUST. L. REV. 933 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible, 
7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005); Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing 
Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); Robin Kundis Craig 
& Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46 AKRON L. REV. 841 (2013); Robert 
L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism 
Concerns, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159 (2009); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered 
Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of New Age Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN 
L.J. 50 (2001); Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1455 (2010); Holly Doremus, Through Another’s Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside 
Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247 (2011).   
6. See, e.g., Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973). 
7. Donald Ludwig, The Era of Management is Over, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 758 (2001); 
Denise Lach et al., Taming the Waters: Strategies to Domesticate the Wicked Problems of Water 
Resource Management, 3 INT’L J. WATER 1 (2005). 
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Wicked problems are remarkably complex and seemingly intractable 
issues which Rittel and Weber first characterized by describing ten 
components.8  For present purposes, these can be consolidated to three 
common elements.  First, the problem cannot be definitively described; in 
other words, “knowing what distinguishes an observed condition from a 
desired condition” is not possible.9  Second, wicked problems involve some 
aspect of fairness or equity, which is disputed among the stakeholders.  
Third, there is no such thing as a lasting definitive solution to a wicked 
problem.  This element is a bit trickier than the prior two, because it can 
only be assumed to be an element from past and present context, until 
disproven at some point in the future.  Nonetheless, the presence of ad hoc 
measures to alleviate the negative consequences of the problem and the 
persistence of the problem despite attempts to solve it strongly suggest that 
the problem is a “wicked” one.  Yet, such seemingly intractable conflicts still 
excite a broad variety of stakeholders, demanding the attention and action 
of policymakers.  We should stress at this point that “wickedness” does not 
mean unmanageable and is not an excuse for inaction or avoiding the 
underlying policy problems. 
The shift toward embracing complexity has likewise been made in 
social-science models of how science interacts with policy.  The linear model 
of basic science research leading to applied science that brings benefits to 
society has been replaced by more nuanced—and historically accurate—
models, in which society has a greater say in the scientific process.  Several 
commentators argue that the social contract between society and science has 
changed.10  What society now demands is science that is socially robust, 
where society can talk with science and aid in its production, rather than just 
be the recipient of scientific knowledge.11  This new contract puts more strain 
on experts, in part because the complex problems are more likely to be 
beyond the specific understanding on any one expert or discipline, but also 
because the “legitimacy” of experts is no longer assumed.12  Narratives that 
involve broad participation are therefore essential to socially acceptable 
science.13  In recent years there have been mounting calls from social 
 
8. See, e.g., Rittel and Webber, supra note 6. 
9. Id. at 159. 
10. See, e.g., D.E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION (1997); Michael Gibbons, Science’s New Social Contract with Society,  
402 NATURE C81 (1999). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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scientists, policymakers, natural scientists, and advocacy organizations for 
socially informed science with more stakeholder involvement.14 
A variety of organizations and methods exist to facilitate dialogue 
between the needs and desires of society and the production of science.  
These devices for producing socially relevant science are broadly categorized 
as “boundary organizations”15 and transdisciplinary methodologies (or 
“transdisciplinarity”).16  They both stress the importance of nonscientist 
stakeholder involvement in question crafting and scientific research.17  An 
underlying assumption of these approaches is that multiple societal values 
can be sufficiently resolved and prioritized through consensus processes to 
guide science production.18  While such processes can be successful, it 
depends on what problem is being addressed.  
When boundary organizations come up against issues related to 
natural resource management, they face the mess of conflicting societal 
values, uses, and priorities that form the tangled, but not unmanageable, 
knot of wicked problems.  In these situations, consensus processes—or 
worse, undefined processes—fail to resolve basic questions of competing 
values.  The shortcomings of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management 
Program (“AMP”) illustrate this point.  The Glen Canyon AMP was created by 
the Secretary of the Interior19 to manage flows of the Colorado River from 
the Glen Canyon Dam through science-based experimentation in a way that 
 
14. Heather J. Aslin & Kirsty L. Blackstock, ‘Now I’m Not an Expert in Anything’: 
Challenges in Undertaking Transdisciplinary Inquiries Across the Social and Biophysical Sciences, in 
TACKLING WICKED PROBLEMS THROUGH THE TRANSDISCIPLINARY IMAGINATION 117 (Valerie A. 
Brown et al. eds., 2010).   
15. Thomas F Gieryn, Boundary-work and the Demarcation of Ccience from Non-science: 
Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 781 (1983). 
16. Aslin & Blackstock, supra note 14. 
17. Gieryn, supra note 15; Aslin and Blackstock, supra note 14. 
18. Compare Lawrence Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive 
Management in Practice, 49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47, 47 (2012) (discussing failed 
stakeholder processes) with Lance Gunderson & Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management 
and Adaptive Governance in the Everglades Ecosystem, 39 POL’Y SCI. 332, 326–27 (2006) 
(discussing the Everglades adaptive management stakeholder process).   
19. Notice of Establishment for Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management 
Work Group, 62 Fed. Reg. 6264 (Feb. 11, 1997). 
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mitigated and resolved the competing uses of the river.20  The conflict-
mitigation purpose of the program depended on a stakeholder working 
group, whose members were determined by charter to include state and 
federal agencies, tribes, state governments in basin, environmental groups, 
recreation groups, and power purchasing contractors.21  Although the 
program did have some successful experiments, there has been no 
management change as a result of those experiments.22  The program’s 
major weakness was that it failed to set priorities among competing uses 
and assumed that the stakeholder group could resolve its differences 
without a set structure.23  Additionally, the relationship between the 
stakeholder group and scientists was not well defined.24  Even though the 
program performed experiments and stakeholders had a mechanism for 
communication, the lack of well-defined rules and priorities created a 
nonadaptive program that resulted in more litigation.25 
It is our contention though that boundary organizations and 
transdisciplinarity do not stop at the steps of the courthouse.  Rather, courts 
themselves act as boundary organizations, and litigation offers a parallel 
route to transdisciplinarity.  In natural resource and environmental disputes 
the court functions as a historically rooted intermediary between science 
and policy.  Most models and descriptions of boundary organizations would 
insist that science production is now a nonlinear joint venture between 
science and society, with society helping to craft scientific questions.  
However, many boundary organizations originate in the scientific 
community and then seek appropriate suitors in society to fund and use 
their product.26  If this is true, then courts provide an alternative path, where 
 
20. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009); Susskind et al., supra 
note 18, at 47. 
21. Susskind et al., supra note 18, at 48. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. (“The Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 was expected to reduce 
conflict and clarify how the dam should be operated.  Unfortunately, the U.S. 
Congress simply reiterated the importance of water management, power generation, 
and environmental, cultural and recreational resources, failing to set priorities 
among these competing concerns.”). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See Laurens Hessels et al., In Search of Relevance: The Changing Contract Between 
Science and Society, 36.5 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 387–401 (2009); cf. Laurens Klerkx & Cees 
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the starting point is values and priorities—as codified in statutes and 
formalized in common law.  For example, the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”) places the value of species protection far beyond those of most 
economic concerns.27  It is worth noting that codified values and common 
law are rough approximations of the values of the time the case is 
litigated.28  As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, “[l]aw has everywhere a 
tendency to lag behind the facts of life.”29  
In Part I of this article, we make the case for considering courts as a type 
of boundary organization.  We will use the litigation over the federally listed 
endangered delta smelt fish in California as a case study to demonstrate the 
ways in which courts can become deeply enmeshed in the scientific 
complexities of fishery management and water allocation, to the point where 
they guide and inform the process of socially relevant science production.  
Specifically, the federal district and appellate courts played decisive roles in 
setting the timeline for scientific production, defining ecological thresholds, 
and deciding on permissible ways to deal with uncertainty.  
By applying the scientific literature examining boundary organizations in 
the context of the judicial system, we will demonstrate the ways in which the 
courts fit into this theoretical framework.  Reviewing the path of the litigation 
regarding the delta smelt fish situates this analysis within the actual workings 
of the trial and appellate courts.  By evaluating the series of decisions 
 
Leeuwis, Delegation of Authority in Research Funding to Networks: Experiences with a Multiple 
Goal Boundary Organization, 35 SCI. & PUBLIC POL’Y 183–196 (2008). 
27. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1978) (“It may 
seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch 
fish . . . would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam,” however, 
“the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require precisely that result.”). 
28. “The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many 
centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and 
corollaries of a book of mathematics.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., SELECTIONS FROM 
THE COMMON LAW, in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, 
LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 52 (Max Lerner ed., 1946). 
29. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 464 (1916) (noting that 
“legal science” is not always as quick as other sciences (e.g., economics and 
sociology) to adapt to changing conditions); cf. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 250 (1975) (arguing that law is collective, influenced by 
forces outside of itself, “[t]he greatest of all legal fictions is that the law itself 
evolves, from case to case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity, 
unswayed by expedient considerations”).  
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regarding the type and quality of scientific research to be completed and to be 
considered during the proceedings themselves, the courts act as major 
components in the production and certification of science.  The mechanisms 
of appellate review further shape the science; however, the seminal role of the 
district court receives special scrutiny in order to examine how a trial court 
navigates through contested technical issues. 
Part II of this article turns back to social science and science-and-
technology studies to consider what potential lessons on process and 
stakeholder engagement litigation and courts can offer to other 
transdisciplinary methods and boundary organizations.  We highlight those 
related to three aspects of the delta smelt litigation: (1) constraints that are 
mediated by consideration of broader social-ecological contexts, e.g., who 
can be involved, what evidence considered, and how; (2) levels of review and 
predetermined levels of scrutiny; and (3) built in mechanisms for adaptation 
(learning and changing approaches).  Finally, we conclude by suggesting 
areas of future research, such as in comparative reviews of judicially guided 
production of scientific research, as well as how such actions by lower courts 
affect reversal rates by appellate courts. 
 
II. In What Ways can Courts be Considered Boundary 
Organizations? 
Common law courts have, partly by default, become major arenas for 
science-informed decision-making, especially for cases in which priorities 
and values conflict.  This is common in cases of complex litigation over 
water rights, land use development, and endangered species protection.30  
Courts are boundary organizations for at least two reasons.  First, they are 
policymaking bodies that use science to inform conflict resolution and 
clarify rules for human-environment interaction.  As part of this aspect, 
courts include multiple mechanisms and rules for stakeholder involvement 
and inclusion of scientific evidence.  Second, they engage in directing the 
course of scientific research. 
Political science professor David H. Guston argues that while boundary 
organizations, which blur the line between science and policy, are useful to 
 
30. D. C. McKinley et al., When Peer-Reviewed Publications are not Enough! Delivering 
Science for Natural Resource Management, 21 FOREST POL’Y AND ECON. 1, 2 (2012) 
(“Discussion on America’s land ethic continues to this day and will certainly continue 
to evolve.  Often this discussion is expressed in the judicial system by groups 
wanting to suspend forest management activities that are perceived to not be 
aligned with their view of a land ethic.”). 
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scientists, they can also lead to better policymaking.31  According to Guston, 
boundary organizations have three characteristics: (1) they provide a means 
to create and use boundary objects; (2) they involve participation from 
scientists and non-scientists; and (3) they straddle the line between politics 
and science, while remaining accountable to both.32  
As the delta smelt case study below illustrates, courts and lawsuits 
involving questions of science are, by definition and function, boundary 
organizations.  The courts’ rulings can be viewed as boundary objects 
created and utilized in the process of litigation.  Courts sit on the line 
between politics, policy making, and science.  The question of accountability 
is the most problematic for courts as boundary organizations.  While 
considered to be independent, judges are accountable for their decisions 
and can be overturned by appellate courts.  Whether courts, and judges in 
particular, are actually accountable to the scientific community for their 
decisions on science issues is a question for further study.  
A.  Courts as Policy-Makers 
Courts can be considered boundary organizations because they are 
still part of the political landscape.33  Even judicial selection is political in 
nature—whether the judges are appointed by the executive branch and 
confirmed by the legislator (as in multiple states and at the federal level) or 
whether judgeships operate under Jacksonian-era conventions, subject to 
direct election by the voters (as in several other states).  In either instance, 
courts are boundary organizations in that they are compelled to interpret 
science findings in the broader politically charged context of social disputes. 
Courts are political actors in that they serve political functions (e.g., 
resolving disputes, legitimizing government) and create policy through 
 
31. David H. Guston, Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An 
Introduction, 26 SCI. TECH. AND HUM. VALUES 399 (2001). 
32. Id. at 401.  
33. See, e.g., Carl Bauer, Slippery Water Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the Neoliberal 
Model in Chile, 1981–1995, 38 NAT. RES. J. 109 (1998); cf. CARL BAUER, SIREN SONG:  
CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2004) (discussing in part 
the failure of Chilean courts to fulfill their political function in resolving water 
disputes); see also MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960 
(1992) (writing about the long trend, at least in the United States, of moving away 
from a concept of law as autonomous or “a ‘science’ that could be separate from 
politics . . . sharply distinguished from moral or political reasoning”). 
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judicial review and dispute resolution.34  Courts however are unlike other 
political actors in terms of how they are constrained in their abilities to 
exercise power.35  Comparative law scholar Martin Shapiro notes that “courts 
tend to be loaded with multiple political functions . . . from bolstering the 
legitimacy of the political regime to allocating scarce economic resources or 
setting major social policies.”36  But, the primary function of courts is still 
dispute resolution,37 which along with the requirements of standing38 and a 
tradition of promoting the perception of judicial independence,39 constrain 
the ability of courts to exercise power.  
These constraints do not remove courts from the policy realm.  The 
requirements of standing and the adversarial nature of the disputes heard 
by courts actually make the dispute resolution function of courts inherently 
political.  For example, because of the standing requirements, legally 
relevant knowledge tends to be interest-laden, such that “the choice 
between alternative . . . accounts necessarily involves normative, even 
political judgments.”40  In this way, courts are part of the policymaking 
process.41  The legal constraints that courts and judges abide by therefore 
produce policy or rules that are primarily applicable to the dispute being 
heard.  But in doing so, courts still create broader policy consequences, 
applicable beyond the disputants.  
Particularly in regard to questions of law, such as a motion for 
summary judgment, judges apply legal reasoning to examine the sufficiency 
of the detailed scientific research proffered by litigants as evidence.  By 
permitting certain research models or particular scientific experts to be 
allowed into court proceedings, the judge establishes and polices the 
boundary delineating legally sanctioned science.  In addition, since even 
 
34. See generally HERBERT JACOB ET AL., COURTS LAW & POLITICS 16–80 (2000). 
35. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS, A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
(1981). 
36. Id. at 63. 
37. JACOB, supra note 34, 16–80. 
38. See, e.g., Daniel Ho & and Erica Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing 
Doctrine—An Empirical Study on the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 
(2010). 
39. See, e.g., THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL 
FUNCTIONING OF COURTS 140–161 (1970). 
40. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 209 (1995).  
41. See generally JACOB, supra note 34. 
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“good” science may be deemed irrelevant to the issues in question, the 
judge’s role as gatekeeper in regard to admissibility of evidence will act to 
shape the contours of the litigation.   
These decisions can have far-felt impacts beyond the instant case.  
Since the judicial system in the United States operates under the principle 
of stare decisis, a line of precedent can be established on appellate review of a 
lower court’s ruling on evidence of a scientific nature that could be followed 
indefinitely into the future.  Further, while one district court’s rulings are not 
binding on other courts, they are persuasive and can become influential as 
models for handling novel scientific arguments—i.e., legitimizing certain 
scientific approaches over others. 
The political nature of courts comes to the fore in cases where science 
is in dispute.  As science, technology, and society (“STS”) studies 
demonstrate, a court’s adoption of science can also lead to the science’s 
validation in other areas, such as policymaking.42  In their case study of the 
Klamath Basin conflict, Dan Tarlock and Holly Doremus describe how 
litigants used scientific studies to strengthen their water rights claims.43  
Because the underlying rights claims conflicted, so too did the scientific 
conclusions the litigants used to support their claims.  Tarlock and Doremus 
describe this phenomenon as “combat biology.”44  When courts decide 
disputes involving combat biology, and “combat science” generally, they 
implicitly—and occasionally, explicitly—legitimize the science, and sources 
of science, used by the victors.45  In this way, courts can be particularly 
influential science filters for policy decisions.  
 
  
 
42. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Law, Science, and Science Studies: Contrasting the 
Deposition of a Scientific Expert with Ethnographic Studies of Scientific Practice, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 85 (2002); MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003). 
43. HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO 
LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 11–13 (2007). 
44. Id. at xvii. 
45. See generally JASANOFF, supra note 40; see also Steven Shapin, Cordelia’s Love: 
Credibility and the Social Studies of Science, 3 PERSP. ON SCI. 255 (1995). 
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B.  Gatekeepers and Directors of Science—The Delta 
Smelt Consolidated Cases 
The underlying tension in the legal disputes over the delta smelt is not 
the fish itself, but longstanding conflicts over water allocation priority in 
California.  The delta smelt’s status as a threatened and now endangered 
species brought these tensions to the forefront.  The delta smelt (Hypomesus 
transpacificus) is a small fish, averaging under three inches in length, endemic 
to California.  While diminutive in size, the fish plays an important part in 
the delta ecosystem and it has received special recognition as “the only true 
native estuarine species found in the [Sacramento-San Joaquin] Delta.”46  In 
1993, in recognition of critical declines in population and challenges to fish 
habitat, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) issued a final 
rule listing the delta smelt as threatened under the federal Endangered 
Species Act.47  
The natural habitat of the delta smelt is affected by two large water 
diversion projects, the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State Water 
Project (“SWP").48  The projects redirect the flows of the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin rivers from their confluence at the Bay-Delta through two pumping 
stations at the south of the delta to irrigate farms in the Central Valley and 
provide water to California’s urban southern coast.49  The listing of the smelt 
under the Endangered Species Act required the Bureau of Reclamation to 
consult with the FWS to determine whether and how operation of the CVP 
negatively affected delta smelt.50  This is a deceptively difficult question, 
because the multiple interdependencies of the smelt’s habitat are not wholly 
known; and in studying questions related to delta smelt health and habitat, 
researchers have to work within considerable uncertainties.51  But adjustments 
to the projects could affect the timing and amount of water delivered to 
contractors who have come to expect and depend on water deliveries. 
 
46. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of 
Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg. 12854 (Mar. 5, 1993) [hereinafter 
Delta Smelt Endangerment Finding]. 
47. Id.  
48. The United States Bureau of Reclamation operates the CVP and the state 
of California operates the SWP. 
49. DAVID CARLE, INTRODUCTION TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA 92–104 (2004). 
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2011). 
51. See, e.g., Delta smelt (Hypomesus transpacificus), U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/ speciesProfile.action?spcode=E070 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2015); see also Delta Smelt Endangerment Finding, supra note 46. 
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Thus, when the delta smelt was listed, it set into motion a long and 
contentious series of legal battles among federal authorities, state agencies 
in California, nonprofit advocacy groups, water management authorities, 
and farmers, among others, over potential management plans for the delta 
smelt and the far-reaching consequences of these plans on water resources 
for over half the state of California.  As an example of the remarkable 
geographic extent of this complex legal entanglement, the Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California, which relies on substantial freshwater 
interbasin transfers from the river system associated with the delta to 
provide drinking water to nearly seventeen million residents in and around 
Los Angeles and San Diego,52 is a party to the litigation.53   
The case study for this article involves a series of cases brought by 
different parties, which were consolidated for their central nexus involving 
the delta smelt, and later appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.54  This is only one of five fully consolidated suits that 
relate to operations of the CVP, SWP, and endangered species.55  All sides 
involved in this protracted struggle have called upon science to bolster their 
respective arguments and proposals, as well as in an attempt to undermine 
the positions of other participants.  Given the extensive requirements of the 
ESA regarding the protection afforded to listed species and the very 
substantial financial costs associated with the different variants of the 
management plans, a multitude of scientific reports have been 
commissioned to study the delta smelt and impacts on its habitat.56  
Litigants relied on scientists to review and critique the studies of adversarial 
parties.   
 
52.  DAVID CARLE, INTRODUCTION TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA 92–104 (2004). 
53. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar (Delta Smelt 
Consolidated Cases I), 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
54. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied sub nom., Stewart & Jasper Orchard v. Jarwell, No. 14-377, 2015 WL 132972, 
at *1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015), and State Water Contractors v. Jarwell, No. 14-402, 2015 WL 
132973, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015). 
55. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell (Delta Smelt Consolidated 
Cases II), 747 F.3d at 601. 
56. See, e.g., US FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE DELTA 
SMELT (2008), http://www.fws.gov/sfbaydelta/documents/swp-cvp_ops_bo_12-15_ 
final_ocr.pdf [hereinafter FWS BiOp 2008]; SCOTT MCKINLEY ET AL., SCIENCE REVIEW OF 
TESTIMONY IN THE DELTA SMELT CASES: SUMMARY REPORT (2011), http://www.resolv.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/Delta-Smelt-Summary-Report-Final-3-redacted-3.pdf. 
15 - ZIAJA_FULLERTON FINAL 4.22.15.DOCX 4/28/2015  11:15 AM 
West  Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 2015 
 
230 
 
1. History of the Dispute 
Of the many court cases in the “continuing war over protection of the 
delta smelt”57 we focus only on two here, the federal district court opinion, 
written by Judge Oliver W. Wanger, in San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water 
Authority v. Salazar (Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I), 760 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. 
Cal. 2010), and the divided Ninth Circuit panel opinion reviewing that case, 
San Luis and Delta Water Authority v. Jewell (Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II), 747 
F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014).  At issue in these cases was a FWS Biological 
Opinion (“BiOp”) issued on December 15, 2008, described as “the most 
complex biological opinion ever prepared.”58  Since the initial listing of the 
smelt as a threatened species in 1993, actions taken to protect the fish 
proved unable to prevent fish populations from continuing to shrink.59  The 
2008 BiOp attempted to answer whether continued operation of the CVP 
would jeopardize the smelt and found that the continued operations would 
jeopardize the smelt’s habitat.60  The district court found that conclusion to 
be arbitrary and capricious.61  The court of appeals disagreed and reversed.62 
 
57. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 863.  
58. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 592. 
59. See FWS BiOp 2008, supra note 56, at 140. 
60. See FWS BiOp 2008, supra note 56, at 276–79; see also Delta Smelt Consolidated 
Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 864. 
61. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 968–70.  Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), administrative agency decisions, such the 2008 
BiOp conclusion regarding harm to the delta smelt, are reviewed under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2011) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law . . . .” (emphasis added)).  An agency’s decision is “arbitrary and capricious if [it] 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed 
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”  Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 869 (citing Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see 
also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding 
that a reviewing court may overturn an agency’s action as arbitrary and capricious if 
the agency failed to consider relevant factors, failed to base its decision on those 
factors, and/or made a “clear error of judgment”). 
62. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 592. 
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The FWS found four significant threats to the future viability of the 
species existed in the delta: (1) direct entrainments by state and federal water 
export facilities;63 (2) summer and fall increases in salinity;64 (3) summer and 
fall increases in water clarity;65 and (4) effects from introduced species.66  The 
BiOp, as part of the Long-Term Operational Criteria and Plan, examined the 
manner in which operations of the federally managed CVP and SWP 
influenced the life cycle of the delta smelt.67  In the analysis of the BiOp, 
cooperative management of these two major water projects under existing 
practices would be “likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the delta 
smelt and adversely modify its critical habitat.”68  As part of a separate five-
year review of the status of the delta smelt population, FWS concluded that 
new scientific evidence supported a heightened listing of the smelt from 
threatened to endangered, although FWS admitted that other higher-priority 
issues prevented the rapid initiation of such listing procedures.69  
Due to the conclusions of the BiOp, the FWS issued a required 
“Reasonable and Prudent Alternative” (“RPA”) to prescribe actions necessary 
to protect the delta smelt, while allowing for a partial continuance of 
existing water project management practices.70  The RPA recommended that 
the operation of CVP and SWP be substantially altered through the 
imposition of restrictions on pumping at different times of the year when 
certain water levels and salinity levels in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
were deemed to be crucial for the protection of the delta smelt.71 
  
 
63. FWS BiOp 2008, supra note 56, at 164–165. 
64. Id. at 187. 
65. Id. at 150.  
66. Id. at 202. 
67. See id. at 159–78. 
68. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
69. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a 
Petition to Reclassify the Delta Smelt From Threatened to Endangered Throughout 
Its Range, 75 Fed. Reg. 17667 (April 7, 2010). 
70. See FWS BiOp 2008, supra note 56, at 279. 
71. See id. at 280. 
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The Bureau of Reclamation implemented some of the restrictions 
during a preliminary review period.  As a result, water supplies were notably 
curtailed to various irrigation districts and urban water districts.72  These 
curtailments were seen as substantial threats to the economics of the status 
quo operations of these entities.73  As a result, several of these affected 
parties entered the legal proceedings and sued the FWS and Bureau of 
Reclamation, challenging the scientific bases for both the conclusions made 
in the BiOp and the proposed actions grounded in those conclusions.74   
Over six hundred documents, many of them offering or challenging 
scientific “claims” offered by experts, were filed with the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of California leading up to the December 14, 2010 
decision.  Various plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment, with 
similar counter-claims issued by defendants.75  As stated by the district 
court, “summary judgment becomes the ‘mechanism for deciding, as a 
matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative 
record [AR] and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.’”76 
2.  District Court’s Role in Defining Relevant and Legitimate 
Science 
The district court was asked to address a difficult problem.  Judge 
Wanger’s expression of the limits of the law to truly resolve water allocation 
in California belies the wickedness of the problem:  
 
A court is bound by law.  Resource allocation and establishing 
legislative priorities protecting the environment are the 
prerogatives of other branches of government.  The law alone cannot 
afford protection to all the competing interests at stake in these cases.77 
 
 
72. Daniel B. Wood, Water Crises Squeezes California’s Economy, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0912/p02s01-ussc.html; 
Peter Fimrite, Ruling to Protect Delta Smelt May Force Water Rationing in Bay Area, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 1, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Ruling-to-protect-delta-
smelt-may-force-water-2506504.php.  
73. See Wood, supra note 72; Fimrite, supra note 72.  
74. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863–67 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 868. 
77. Id. at 968 (emphasis added). 
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There has been no resolution to the underlying conflicts in water allocation 
between the smelt and competing water needs.  It cannot be tackled as a 
simple problem to which science would have an answer.78  Nonetheless, all 
parties in the case relied on science to support their legal claims. 
The district court became the battleground for the use of “combat 
science” in determining the sufficiency of the FWS’s documentation and 
research in its administrative record for the recommended actions aimed at 
protecting the delta smelt and its estuarine habitat.  In resolving the 
dispute—at least on summary judgment—and weighing competing expert 
testimony, the court assumed the role of a boundary organization.  It sorted 
through the voluminous filings and applied judicial principles, statutory 
requirements, and administrative regulations to determine which parties can 
participate, what types of science would be admitted, how much deference 
should be accorded to FWS-sponsored studies, and—ultimately—whose 
scientific research would be adjudged most determinative in the proceedings.  
The district court noted that the recommended actions issued by the 
FWS, under the auspices of the ESA, were required to be based on the “best 
scientific and commercial data available.”79  The question of whether any 
scientific data is “best” is contestable.  Scientific communities may have 
their own standards to judge what is considered to be “best” data.80  
However, in litigation, courts determine what qualifies as the “best scientific 
and commercial data available.”  There are nonetheless prescribed 
guidelines for judges to use to determine whether scientific data is 
acceptable or not to guide FWS actions.81  These guidelines tend to turn on 
whether the agency acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner (i.e., if the 
connection between the data and the action is reasonably related)82 and 
whether there are “unrebutted expert opinions” to the contrary.83   
If the district court determined that the FWS had failed to employ the 
best available science, as required, the agency’s final rule would be 
considered arbitrary and capricious and remanded to the agency for further 
 
78. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 6. 
79. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 870–71 (citing 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8)) (2009). 
80. See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979). 
81. For examples of statutory requirements regarding when this standard is 
mandated, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), 1536(a)(2), (c) (2011). 
82. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1147 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
83. N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
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study.84  Judge Wanger weighed two main aspects of science in the Delta 
Smelt Consolidated Cases I decision: (1) the reasonableness and rigor of the 
science itself; and (2) whether the science used in the case supported the 
policy actions of the agencies in question.  Together these formed the basis 
for judging “best available science.” 
The district court’s 225-page decision engaged in a detailed review of 
whether FWS used the best available science in the BiOp.  Plaintiffs assailed 
several elements of FWS’s methodology in preparing the BiOp.  While 
declines in the numbers of smelt provided the basis for much of the 
reasoning in the BiOp, the plaintiffs criticized the FWS’s methods for 
conducting smelt populations censuses and determining anthropogenic 
influences on smelt habitat, smelt breeding, and survival rates.85  For 
example, FWS relied on “raw salvage figures” for calculating certain water 
release/flow limits, without accounting for normalizing of these numbers, as 
was standard practice among fishery scientists.86  Further, certain measuring 
practices were followed in some instances, but not others, with no 
explanation as to the variance.87  In yet other situations, conclusions were 
reached with very little justification in the administrative record to detail the 
how or why of such reasoning.88  Arguments also centered on the alleged 
flaws in modeling, or in the inappropriate comparison of data across 
incompatible computer models.89  
The district court reviewed testimony from experts in each field before 
deciding whether the FWS had incorporated acceptable science into the 
administrative record to support the BiOp.90  Additionally, the district court 
admitted two expert reports into evidence that were not part of the 
administrative record.91  Considering outside relevant scientific evidence is 
allowed both through tradition92 and through Federal Rule of Evidence 706, 
which permits the court to “appoint any expert that the parties agree on and 
 
84. See Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757, 770 (9th Cir. 2007) (“the 
ordinary remedy when a court finds an agency’s action to be arbitrary and capricious 
is to remand for further administrative proceedings”). 
85. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 881 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
86. Id. at 889. 
87. See id. at 885–90. 
88. See id. at 946–47 
89. See id. at 903–13, 920–22. 
90. See, e.g., id. at 869–947. 
91. See id. at 883, 890. 
92. Brandeis, supra note 29. 
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any of its own choosing.”93  Judge Wanger appointed Doctors Punt and Quinn, 
both from the University of Washington, to advise on the scientific and 
technical aspects of the case, and relied substantially on their testimony.94 
In its conclusion, the district court took the FWS to task for its use of 
“results driven”-”bad science” in creating the BiOp, stating that “the public 
cannot afford sloppy science.”95  As a result, the FWS and its scientists were 
dealt several judicial setbacks.  The district court also ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs regarding the failure to meet a four-part test for evaluation of the 
RPA, stating: 
 
[The] FWS has shown no inclination to fully and honestly address 
water supply needs beyond the species, despite the fact that its 
own regulation requires such consideration. . . . How the 
appropriation of water for the RPA Actions, to the exclusion of 
implementing less harmful alternatives, is required for species 
survival is not explained.  The appropriate remedy for such a 
failure is remand to the agency.96 
 
 
93. Fed. R. Evid. 706(a). 
94. The Ninth Circuit expressed concern over the district court’s allowance of 
evidence beyond the administrative record.  See Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 
F.3d 581, 603 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing the district court proceedings as “giv[ing] the 
appearance that the administrative record was open and that the proceedings were a 
forum for debating the merits of the BiOp”); see also id. at 604 (“Because we review the 
court’s judgment de novo, however, we can confine our own scope of review to the 
administrative record, plus that evidence that satisfies the standards we have set 
forth here.”).  However, it is still important to note that Judge Wanger’s decision to 
admit the extra-record evidence demonstrates the way trial courts can influence the 
social construction of scientific knowledge.  Further research is required to 
understand the frequency with which trial judges proactively avail themselves of such 
experts and how such actions may affect the outcomes of trials—as well as 
contribute to persuasive new forms of scientific knowledge.    
95. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 968. 
96. Id. at 957.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion 
that the FWS failed to explain why it chose the RPAs.  See Delta Smelt Consolidated 
Cases II, 747 F.2d at 635–38 (concluding that “FWS’s consideration of [the RPA factors] 
may be reasonably discerned from the record to satisfy any explanation 
requirements”).  As similarly stated infra Part B.2, this article does not focus on the 
Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of the district court.  Instead, we focus on how a district 
court’s actions can influence the social construction of “science.” 
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The court still upheld the FWS’s determination on several key issues, 
finding alternately either that “best available science” was appropriately 
documented in the administrative record or that the science offered was not 
so insufficient and suspect as to compel the court to remand for additional 
examination.97  For example, while a quantitative life cycle model would be 
considered a “top-of-the-line” method among fishery scientists for 
understanding the impacts of water project management on the delta smelt, 
alternate population study methods were considered sufficient to the extent 
that they “did not per se violate the ESA or the APA,” especially given that a 
model specifically designed for smelt had not yet been created.98  Looking at 
existing precedent, the court ruled that the “best available science” standard 
hinged on the existing and available science, not on “best science 
possible.”99  While such district court decisions can receive unfavorable 
treatment from appellate courts (including in this case), the Delta Smelt 
Consolidated Cases still highlight the powerful role filled by district courts, as 
they are on the front lines and required to make these determinations in the 
absence of clear guidance from statutes, regulations, or precedent. 
Within the context of science and decision-making under the ESA, 
courts choose between competing scientific claims that underlie the BiOp.  
In doing so, a court’s actions in evaluating the value-laden scientific 
products will ultimately shape and direct public policy—i.e., preventing the 
extinction of endangered species, fulfilling legal contracts for water, and so 
forth.  Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I stands for the idea that the court is 
required to make judgments on the caliber of the science used by agencies 
to support their decisions—i.e., a nonscience organization passing 
judgment on whether science used for policymaking is up to adequate 
standards.  As arbiter of both the dispute and the science, the district court 
is a critically important boundary organization.  
C.  Beyond Gate-Keeping: Courts as Science Managers 
A closer analysis of the processes leading up to Judge Wanger’s 
decision and the additional review by the court of appeals demonstrates 
that courts, as boundary organizations, can also be instrumental in directing 
the course of science.  There are at least two ways in which the district and 
appellate courts in this case directed the course of scientific production 
relating to process (e.g., setting the timeline for research) and substance 
 
97. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 968–70. 
98. Id. at 885. 
99. Id. 
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(e.g., defining ecological thresholds and deciding on permissible ways to 
deal with uncertainty).  
While the FWS drafted the 2008 FWS BiOp, the court also played a 
substantial role in its development.  By controlling the amount of time that 
FWS had to complete the BiOp, the district court affected the final form of 
the BiOp and FWS’s choice of methodologies to complete the document 
within the limited time frame.100  
Prior to the 2008 BiOp, the FWS had issued a 2005 BiOp on a similar 
topic.101  The 2005 BiOp concluded that the operations of the CVP and SWP 
“would not have an adverse effect on the continued existence and recovery of 
the delta smelt and its critical habitat.”102  In Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Kempthorne, the district court found the 2005 BiOp to be arbitrary and 
capricious.103  After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the Kempthorne court 
required the CVP and SWP to release winter pulse flows within a specific 
cubic feet per second (“cfs”) range.104  That order was intended to be a bridge 
measure, while the FWS completed a new BiOp based on the findings of fact 
and law from the earlier dispute.105  The district court gave the FWS a strict 
deadline of only nine months to complete the new BiOp.106  
The product of that nine-month rush was the 2008 BiOp, which was the 
focus in Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I.  Not surprisingly, given the quick 
court-mandated turn around, the 2008 BiOp was less than perfect.  The court 
of appeals noted that the BiOp was “at more than 400 pages, a big bit of a 
mess.  And the FWS knew it.”107  It “appear[ed] to be the result of exactly 
what we would imagine happens when an agency is ordered to produce an 
important opinion on an extremely complicated and technical subject 
matter covering multiple federal and state agencies and affecting millions of 
acres of land and tens of millions of people” and only given nine months to 
complete it.108  Deadlines of that kind “become a substantive constraint on 
 
100. See Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 605–06 (discussing how the 
tight court ordered deadline lead to a “jumbled” and “chaotic” document). 
101. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 863. 
102. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 597 (citing Delta Smelt Consolidated 
Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 863). 
103. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 387–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
104. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 597. 
105. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 863 & n.1. 
106. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 605 & n.15. 
107. Id. at 604. 
108. Id. at 605. 
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what an agency can reasonably do.”109  The deadline for the 2008 BiOp was 
not determined by the FWS but “by the same district court that would later 
hold the FWS’s rushed BiOp as arbitrary and capricious.”110 
Interactions with earlier district court orders also played a role in 
determining certain ecological thresholds, specifically the appropriate cap of 
reverse flows from the delta.  While the Kempthorne court found the 2005 
BiOp to be arbitrary and capricious,111 the court’s order, which set a 5,000 cfs 
cap on reverse flows from the CVP and SWP, greatly influenced the FWS’s 
2008 BiOp.112  Although the 5,000 cfs cap was intended as a stop gap 
measure, the FWS relied on the court’s order and the studies which the court 
relied on when setting the reverse flow threshold in its 2008 BiOp.113  The 
Ninth Circuit noted: “FWS can hardly be faulted for thinking that the district 
court’s acceptance of those studies and the issuing of an order with real-
world consequences for people and smelt might present at least a prima facie 
case for the –5,000 cfs figure.”114  
The Ninth Circuit decision was also instructive on deciding permissible 
ways to deal with scientific uncertainty.  Throughout the opinion, the panel 
reiterated that the ESA’s “best available science” standard does not equate 
with perfect knowledge.115  The range of acceptable uncertainty is quite 
broad and the agency has discretion to lean on the scales in favor of 
conservative estimates.116  For example:  
 
 
109. Id. at 606. 
110. Id. at 605. 
111. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 387–88 
(E.D. Cal. 2007). 
112. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 608–14; Delta Smelt Consolidated 
Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863–64 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (setting a cap of 5,000 cfs). 
113. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 614. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 602 (citing Kern County Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1080–
81 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Absent superior data[,] occasional imperfections do not violate 
the ESA best available standard.” (internal quotations omitted));  see also id. (“[W]here 
the information is not readily available, we cannot insist on perfection”); id. (quoting 
Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 344 F.3d 832, 872 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We defer to an 
agency decision not to invest the resource necessary to conduct the perfect study, 
and we defer to a decision to use the means [the FWS] use[d] to account for any 
imperfections in its data and the situation to which those means are applied.”)). 
116. See, e.g., id. at 608. 
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[T]he Supreme Court has held that an agency may choose to 
“counteract uncertainties” inherent in its scientific analyses by 
“overestimat[ing]” known parameters without being 
unreasonable and we have upheld an agency’s reliance on 
models that “yield conservative data because the models 
incorporate the higher of [known potential values] in assessing 
the overall risk.”117   
 
In other words, despite the rational management language of the ESA, the 
interpretation of courts overseeing ESA disputes recognize that uncertainty 
happens and may not always be overcome even in the best of 
circumstances.118  Instead of demanding “best possible” science, the courts 
are deferential to agency discretion in matters of scientific uncertainty. 
II.  Lessons for Other Boundary Organizations 
The district court in Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I overreached in its 
reliance on outside experts and willingness to decide on the validity and 
quality of scientific methodologies and conclusions.  The Ninth Circuit 
disapproved of this “open record” approach:  
 
In places, the district court pits the experts against each other 
and resolves their contrary positions as a matter of scientific fact.  
In effect, the district court opened the BiOp to a post-hoc notice-
and-comment proceeding involving the parties’ experts, and then 
judged the BiOp against the comments received.119   
 
Furthermore, the district court “relied on experts as advocates for the basis 
of rejecting the BiOp.”120  In short, science became the language of conflict.  
Combat science, however, is not unique to the courtroom.  Other 
boundary organizations that deal with wicked problems likewise must deal 
with conflicting expert opinions as proxies for conflicting values and grapple 
with the need to devise and implement policies and adaptive management 
plans in spite of the fray.121  Lengthy environmental litigation, like the delta 
smelt case, offers some lessons to other boundary organizations.  We do not 
 
117. Id. at 610 (citation omitted). 
118. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 5. 
119. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 604 (citations omitted). 
120. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 5, at 1460, 1462–67. 
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suggest that the common law or the federal bench has the problem of combat 
science and stakeholder participation processes completely worked out.  
Judge Wanger’s decision demonstrates quite the opposite.  We suggest that 
the courts have been dealing with problems of conflicting testimony and 
competing values for a long time and thus have developed mechanisms to 
balance values and concepts of equity against opposing scientific claims and 
the needs of society.122  We posit that aspects of these mechanisms could be 
useful to other organizations as lessons for bridging science and policy. 
In this section we focus on three procedural mechanisms that were 
decisive in determining which science prevailed under what conditions.  The 
first is constraints on evidence and participation.  These processes 
determine who can be involved, what evidence can be considered, and in 
what way.  The second mechanism is predetermined levels of review.  This 
includes levels of scrutiny that are triggered by different conditions as well 
as appellate review.  And the third mechanism is built-in means for 
adaptation, or ways to learn and change approaches.  We discuss each of 
these below briefly in relationship to the delta smelt case.  
A.  Constraints on Involvement 
Defining the limits of stakeholder involvement—who can be involved, 
when, to what extent—is an issue that many boundary organizations 
struggle with.123  Who can be involved in legal disputes is determined 
through mechanisms such as the requirements of standing,124 restrictions 
on amici briefs, and rules of evidence.  Additionally, “[c]ourts have (at least 
in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide 
themselves with the instruments required for the performance of their 
duties,”125 including appointing technical experts and fact-finding referees.126  
Standing requirements and the adversarial process also help to ensure that 
 
122. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 33. 
123. See, e.g., Duncan C. McKinley et al., When Peer-Reviewed Publications are Not 
Enough! Delivering Science for Natural Resource Management, 21 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2012). 
124. In layman’s terms, there must be an actual dispute with at least two 
opposing parties who directly benefit from or are harmed by the dispute in order for 
the court to hear the case. 
125. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). 
126. See William Blomquist & Elinor Ostrom, Deliberation, Learning, and 
Institutional Change: The Evolution of Institutions in Judicial Settings, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 
180, 184 (2008). 
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the court is well briefed on all the arguments of the dispute at hand, an 
advantage over other policy institutions.127   
Importantly, these constraints are moderated by measured flexibility.  
Courts for example can look outside the administrative record in a case, as 
the district court did in Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I.  This point was also 
stressed in the Ninth Circuit opinion as well as Judge Arnold’s dissent.128  
Although courts maintain the flexibility to solicit and consider information 
external to the administrative record, that flexibility is mediated by specific 
requirements.  These constraints include circumstances in which: “(1) 
supplementation is necessary to determine if the agency considered all 
factors and explained its decision; (2) the agency relied on documents not in 
the record; (3) supplementation is needed to explain in technical terms or 
complex subjects; or (4) plaintiffs have shown bad faith on the part of the 
agency.”129  In sum, courts cannot seek to expand administrative records 
without a clear justification.  
The suite of constraints need not be adopted by all boundary 
organizations (nor could they necessarily).  But it could be instructive to 
decide, prior to beginning research or bridging science and policy, rules that 
define the characteristics of who can be involved, when and to what extent 
they can be involved, and when those general rules can be broken.   
B.  Multiple Nested Levels of Review 
Here we refer to both “standards of review” (i.e., how much deference 
the court gives to the agency) and the ability of district court decisions to be 
appealed and reviewed.  
  
 
127. Id.; Susan Nunn & Helen Ingram, Information, the Decision Forum, and Third 
Party Effects in Water Transfers, 24 WATER RESOURCES RES. 473 (1988). 
128. See Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d 581, 656 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that Dr. Richard Deriso’s declaration, which was outside the administrative 
record, was appropriately admitted: “this evidence fell within one of the narrow 
exceptions to the general rule against extra-record evidence, because it was necessary 
to explain technical terms or complex subject matter” (citation omitted)). 
129. Fence Creek Cattle Co. v U.S. Forest Serv., 602 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 
2010); see also Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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A common question on stakeholder involvement in scientific 
production is how involved should stakeholders be in directing science.  The 
concern is that while stakeholders may understand issues of conflicting 
values better and be the ultimate users of science products, they tend to not 
be experts.130  
Courts face a similar position.  Lawyers may generally be more 
comfortable than most at using the skill of other experts,131 but that is not a 
substitute for expertise.  The courts have dealt with that problem in part 
through standards of review, which determine how much deference a judge 
should give to an agency decision.  The importance of arbitrary and capricious 
review in the context of addressing complex scientific matters, as well as de 
novo appellate review, can be found throughout Judge Baybee’s Ninth Circuit 
opinion.  The Ninth Circuit’s treatment of FWS’s choice of hydrological models 
is illustrative of this.  In preparing the BiOp, the FWS chose to use two 
different hydrological models together (DAYFLOW and CALSIM II).132  That 
choice, although problematic because FWS was using a historical model and 
future projection model that used different parameters and assumptions, is 
considered to be a “scientific determination.”133  When reviewing “scientific 
determinations” that “require[] a high level of technical expertise,”134 courts 
are required to “generally be at [their] most deferential.”135  That level of 
deference determined what science was legally acceptable. 
  
 
130. See, e.g., P.J. SULLIVAN ET AL., DEFINING AND IMPLEMENTING BEST AVAILABLE 
SCIENCE FOR FISHERIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, POLICY, AND MANAGEMENT 13–22 
(2006), http://fisheries.org/docs/policy_science.pdf (last visited Feb 28, 2015). 
131. As Willard Hurst opined, “[t]he lawyer is the expert whose skill it is to 
make social use of the experts in all other fields.”  Daniel Ernst, Willard Hurst and the 
Administrative State: From Williams to Wisconsin, 18 LAW AND HIST. REV. 1 (2000). 
132. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases II, 747 F.3d at 617. 
133. Id. at 618 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)). 
134. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Ore. Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 
(1989)). 
135. Id. at 602. 
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Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, “[a] court ‘may reject an 
agency’s choice of a scientific model only when the model bears no rational 
relationship to the characteristics of the data to which it is applied.’”136  This 
standard provides a substantial amount of judicial deference to 
administrative agencies and their decisions—allowing the experts to remain 
the experts, rather than the court substituting its opinion.   
While courts have taken on the mantle of boundary organizations in 
part by default, some of the tools used by the courts in adjudicating wicked 
problems involving scientific review may be adaptable for use by other 
boundary organizations.  For example, other boundary organizations could 
use the idea of judicial review standards, scrutiny, and deference to decide 
how closely non-expert stakeholders control the scientific process. 
C.  Mechanisms for Adaptation and Learning 
 Finally, appellate review allows for some modicum of learning and 
adaptation.  The numerous reviews of the 2005 BiOp and the 2008 BiOp, by 
the district courts and the Ninth Circuit, allowed for multiple eyes on the 
problem and monitoring to ensure that courts, as well as parties to the 
dispute, adhered to the agreed upon rules.  It also allows for changes to 
both law137 and science.  Without appellate review, the resulting science-
based rules for operating the CVP and SWP would have been remarkably 
different.  Other boundary organizations could learn from this and consider 
building in mechanisms for review. 
We should note that despite all of their procedural mechanisms to 
deal with science and stakeholders, courts are not necessarily ideal 
boundary organizations.  As Guston discussed, one of the purposes of 
boundary organizations is to mollify both anxious natural scientists and 
aggravated political groups.  He writes, “the boundary organization . . . gives 
both the producers and the consumers of research an opportunity to 
construct the boundary between their enterprises in a way favorable to their 
own perspectives.”138  To the scientists, the organization should support 
their research and demonstrate how it is valuable to policymaking outside of 
science.139  And, to policymakers, the organization should assure them that 
 
136. Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases I, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 908 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 
(emphasis added) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
137. The evolution of law is something thoroughly discussed in legal history, 
and for brevity’s sake we decline to explore it again here. 
138. Guston, supra note 31, at 405. 
139. Id. 
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it is their goals that shape the science coming out of the organization.140  
This appeasement of both the science and policy realms is not something 
that courts are designed to do; nor is it necessarily something that courts 
should attempt to do.  Nonetheless courts are forced into the position of 
being a boundary organization through sifting through science and applying 
it to unavoidable policy questions of a justiciable nature.  
IV. Conclusion 
We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to 
reconsideration upon a slight change in habit of the public mind. 
~Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.141 
 
With the remarkable increase in Congressional requirements since the 
1960s involving clean water, species protection, environmental reviews, 
hazardous waste management, and water management reprioritization, 
there has been an explosion in the amount of scientific research to inform 
and challenge the resulting administrative state.  A resetting of legislative 
priorities, such as through the Central Valley Project Improvement Act,142 
which elevated the protection of fish and wildlife, as well as efforts aimed at 
restoration and mitigation, so as to be on par with more traditional goals of 
federal water projects, such as irrigation, domestic uses, and power 
generation, led to the reframing of the legal landscape.  This type of 
reshuffling has resulted in increasing the role of the judicial system in 
balancing complex ecosystem functions with other societally important 
water and land use objectives.  
We have argued that understanding the interface between scientific 
research and the creation and implementation of public policy is 
fundamental to informed decision-making in the management of complex 
and dynamic social-ecological systems.  We have grounded this approach 
within the context of the historically rooted adversarial nature of the United 
States judicial system.  More specifically, we have analyzed how courts 
function as policymakers, gatekeepers, and directors of scientific research.  
This paper demonstrated how these actions are manifested in such ways as 
through control over the admissibility of scientific research as evidence, 
 
140. Id. 
141. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF LAW (1897), in MIND AND FAITH OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 180 (Max 
Lerner ed., 1946).  
142. Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 
§§ 3401–3412, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992). 
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evaluation of dueling experts in the contest of “combat science,”  the impact 
of stare decisis, the interpretation of ambiguous or outdated legislatively 
prescribed scientific standards, and the legitimization of different 
assessment methods proffered as science by opposing parties.   
This paper explored the concept of courts as boundary organizations 
by examining a case study regarding the complex litigation surrounding 
federally mandated water allocation rules designed to protect the 
endangered delta smelt in California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.  The 
literature on boundary organizations was reviewed in the context of the Delta 
Smelt Consolidated Cases in order to examine the effectiveness of these legal 
arenas as such translational institutions.  The case study demonstrates how 
courts have landed into this role by default when litigation erupts out of 
wicked problems of a combined social and ecological nature.  By some 
measures this case represents an especially high profile example of courts 
as boundary organizations, with a trial court judge experienced in contested 
water law issues, critical appellate review of how the trial court evaluated 
scientific evidence, and a host of well-funded litigants backed by small 
armies of scientific experts in support of their claims.  While not all of these 
elements are always present, these types of cases serve to demonstrate 
many of the strengths and weaknesses of courts in this intermediary 
function regarding the oversight and execution of public policy. 
Courts have become a decisive forum by default for assessing the 
relative merits of scientific evidence in protracted litigation over such thorny 
issues.  In the process, courts function as political institutions presiding 
over considerations of cultural mores, social-ecological values, and the 
allocation of scarce resources like water in the arid West.  While courts may 
sometimes lag in their responsiveness to civic sentiment, they nonetheless 
must navigate through issues of public policy.  Yet these conditions explain 
the context in which courts become boundary organizations, serving to 
negotiate relationships between science and society.  By embracing 
complexity, accepting nonlinear trajectories in the production of scientific 
research, and appreciating the role of transdisciplinary research in 
responding to wicked problems, courts can employ their traditional tools in 
dispute resolution to tackle wicked problems through mechanisms not 
available to other institutions. 
This governance by default approach, however, exposes the relative 
talents and shortcomings of courts in carrying out such a function.  Further 
research is needed to examine how courts can be better supported to carry 
out these demands in effective and efficient ways.  Given the politicization of 
scientific research in the electoral process and its effects on the legislative 
and executive branches of state and federal governments, the somewhat 
more insulated nature of the judicial selection process (largely through 
appointments, recommendations through state bar commissions, and/or 
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nonpartisan elections) may allow the courts to approach the nexus of 
science and public policy from a different perspective.  A comparative 
analysis of the actions of such courts under varying pressures would prove 
instructive in appreciating the limits of courts as boundary organizations.  
Also, scrutiny of the role of courts in curtailing subsequent litigation, 
achieving lower rates of reversal on appeal, developing panels of outside 
scientific experts, and similar judicial approaches in response to wicked 
problems in water and land management deserve additional investigation. 
 
